This paper proposes a reorganization o f the nursing home industry with capital facilities owned by government, but with management conducted through a system of competitive contracts with the private sector. The paper explicitly demonstrates in real estate finance terms how the present system o f private ownership o f captial facilities inherently impedes providing a high quality o f care.
the mortgage holder with a resulting loss of the facility. Or, at an earlier stage, a manager's failure to behave as a " rational businessperson" would lead to the owner's getting a new manager.
Nursing homes derive their basic authority to exist from state licensing requirements, administered by an agency of or delegated by state government. To be eligible for reimbursement under Medicare and/or Medicaid, nursing homes must be certified, by government, in a process separate from their regular licensing. The federal government has promulgated standards the homes must meet in order to be certified (Code o f Federal Regulations [CFR], 1972; 1973) ; although the standards leave a lot to be desired, they are all the " law" there is.
Although the care is provided by private institutions, twothirds of the industry's revenue comes from government, through Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs (Standard and Poor's In dustry Surveys, 1975) . Moreover, under the current fiscal structure, nursing home investors receive multiple subsidy: the reim bursement formulas include a percentage return on invested capital,3 and the sheltering of income from taxation by investment in real estate means that the government foregoes taxes it would otherwise collect.4 Both these forms o f government subsidy provide government-funded income to entities which may have no interest or competence in nursing home care and no responsibility for nursing home care.
In some places, state government subsidizes construction of nursing homes and/or non-profit hospitals through medical care facilities finance agencies which provide up to 100 percent financing.5
Through inspection procedures, government is also ultimately responsible for maintenance of the facilities. Inspection for com pliance with and enforcement of state and local building, fire, and 3 Medicare reimburses according to a cost formula which includes depreciation, in terest on debt, and a return on owner's equity of 1 Vi times the long-term U.S. Treasury bond interest rate as allowable costs. Medicaid reimburses on a per day capitation payment basis, with the amount of the payment determined by the state government. 4 Real estate investment is especially attractive to people in high tax brackets, and the marketing of such investment opportunities is directed to such people. For an exam ple of how nursing homes fit in, see Needham (1969 other safety codes is usually done by state or local health depart ments, fire departments, building departments, or several of these agencies. When any of the responsible agencies conducts an in spection or review and finds a violation, it must follow specified procedures to induce change. All of these procedures take time, and the process can be turned o ff at any of the stages.6 The entire process is easily abused through bribery or through the more subtle pressures that typically dilute the effectiveness of regulation (con stant contact of regulators with regulatees and very little contact with those on whose behalf the regulators theoretically operate). But the problem is not only with individual inspectors; regulatory agencies frequently have official or unofficial policies in favor of negotiation rather than prosecution, and the resulting " political climate" makes termination of licensure or certification very dif ficult. In addition, current reimbursement structures preclude refusing to pay for services rendered during the decertification process.7 bonds whose proceeds were allocated to the construction of non-profit hospitals and nursing homes. inspection for compliance with and enforcement of these types of standards is generally done by the state or local health departments. In addition, there are standards which may be within the purview of the local building department or the local fire department. When any of the responsible agencies conducts an inspection or review and finds a violation, it must follow specified procedures to induce change. If all proceeds normally, however, there will usually be a notice provision specifying a time period for correcting the deficiency. Then there must be a rein spection. There may be " second notice" procedures. Finally, though, there is the power of prosecution. However, prosecutors are generally not from the same agen cies as the inspectors. Inspectors merely file complaints with prosecutors. Prosecutors have other things to think about besides nursing homes, and they are not always anxious to prosecute-particularly when both they and the courts view the issues as essentially civil rather than criminal. Even if they do prosecute, the case may take months to come to resolution and the fine may be quite minimal. Even when the process works completely on schedule, throughout the court proceedings the violation may remain uncorrected. 10 Only those cases with high potential recovery reach litigation, because the lawyer's fee is determined by the amount of recovery, and lawyers do not typically undertake the extensive preparation necessary for successful litigation unless the fee will make it worthwhile. this by forcing resources into the area of fixed costs (capital facilities) rather than variable costs (such as labor and food). In nursing homes, to a greater degree than in some other health care settings, the most important determinants of the quality of care are items of variable cost: the size of the labor force, the level of capability of the labor' force (trained workers are more expensive than untrained ones), adequacy of diet, etc.'1 When these variable cost items are underfunded, patient care suffers. To understand the nature and functioning of these incentives, we have to move from the broad picture of the industry to a financial model of a typical nursing home bed.
Financial Model of a Typical Nursing Home Bed
The nursing home industry is capital-intensive; that is, the industry generates lower annual revenues than the capital required to generate those revenues. Much of the capital intensity is not due to investment in active capital equipment, but rather to investment in real estate.12 In many ways, a nursing home is analogous to an in vestment in an apartment building or hotel. The financial model for a typical nursing home bed (see tables below) demonstrates that the Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements serve to validate the real estate value of a nursing home.
The model assumes that the nursing home bed is owned and operated on a for-profit basis, since three-fourths of all U.S. nursing home beds are so owned and operated. Although this model is incomplete to the extent that there are non-profit operators in the field, it does include those nursing homes owned by individual operators, by tax shelter syndicates, and by corporate chains.
The financial model is based on a composite taken from the Securities and Exchange Commission Forms 10K for National Health Enterprises, Charter Medical Corp., and Beverly En terprises. These three publicly held companies control ap proximately 18,000 nursing home beds. Because the data were taken from forms for 1972 and 1973, investment and revenues are understated in terms of today's costs. Table 3 shows the annual income statement for the typical bed. At first glance, Table 3 appears to show that the nursing home bed is only marginally profitable. A 4.1 percent profit margin, derived from pre-tax income (line 8) divided by net revenues (line 1), is lower than the profit margin in most capital-intensive in dustries. The 12 percent return on owner's equity can be considered a "normal" return in these days o f high interest rates and is con sistent with Medicare reimbursement rates. If, as the table appears to show, return on investment was " normal" and in line with those in other industries competing for the investor's money, we would not be able to explain the rapid growth in the private nursing home industry. However, the income statement shows only part of the picture. For a more realistic understanding, we need in addition to examine a cash-flow statement, depicting the amount of cash the nursing home bed is generating. Real estate attracts a sizable num- Vi y e a r s u s e f u l lif e o f b u i ld i n g ( T a b le 1, lin e 2 ).
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ber of investors; one of the main attractions of real estate as an in vestment is that it produces tax-sheltered cash flow, which can be used for other investments. Cash flow is the key factor in the evaluation of most real estate. Table 4 shows the cash flow statement of our typical nursing home bed.
In comparing the income statement with the cash-flow statement, the most important numbers are the ones which appear in only one table. The income statement, which lists income and ex penses for tax purposes, includes depreciation (Table 3 , line 4). Depreciation is a deductible expense for tax purposes and is based on historical cost. The higher the cost, the higher the depreciation deduction.13 The cash-flow statement does not include depreciation because depreciation does not require cash outlay. Depreciation is only a bookkeeping deduction for allocating the building costs of Table 1 . On the other hand, the cash-flow statement includes (but the income statement does not) an amount for repayment of the principal as well as the interest on the mortgage. Interest on the mortgage is deductible for tax purposes, but repayment of prin cipal is not. (Repayment of principal is considered a capital tran-IJ T h is ta x -a c c o u n tin g n o tio n c a n le a d to th e re p e a te d sa le o f n u rsin g hom es at ever h ig h e r p ric e s w ith M e d ic a re re im b u r s in g a t e v er h ig h e r ra te s. As long as M e d ic a r e /M e d ic a id r e im b u r s e m e n ts a r e s u ffic ie n t to c o v er this " higher" d e p r e c ia tio n , th e h ig h e r sa le p ric e o f th e n u rs in g h o m e is v a lid a te d . a F irst-y ear a m o r t iz a ti o n ; h i g h e r f o r l a t e r y e a r s .
saction, which is neither income nor expense.) Thus, repayment of principal does not appear in the income statement as an expense, but it does appear in the cash-flow statement because it requires the outlay of cash. As long as the depreciation is larger than the amortization of principal, the nursing home is generating cash flow in excess of net income. Cash flow can thus be positive while net income is negative. Table 4 shows that our typical nursing home bed generates cash at the rate of 29 cents per dollar of investment. This is con sidered a very high return in both real estate and non-real-estate cir cles. This high return accounts for the large amount of capital at tracted to the industry and thus for the industry's growth.
The cash generated is now available for whatever the owner may choose to do with it: investment in additional beds, distribution to the owners, or investment in other types of proper ty. Beverly Enterprises, for instance, used its cash flow to invest in second-home developments in northern California.
Implications
The financial model demonstrates that the factor that attracts capital into the nursing home business is not net income but net cash flow. Net cash flow is based in large measure on the depreciation deductions which are bookkeeping matters unrelated to a reduction in economic value, not real cash outlays. Thus, in or der to increase net cash flow, the nursing home entrepreneur wants the highest possible depreciable basis per dollar of owner's equity.
Once the depreciable basis is in place, the entrepreneur seeks to maintain a net operating income sufficient to cover his or her mortgage payments. This process validates the market value of the nursing home real estate by assuring a tax-sheltered cash flow to the owner.
There are only two ways to accomplish this: maximize income and/or minimize expenses. To maximize income, the operator will try to maintain high rates of occupancy and to promote increases in the reimbursement rates under Medicare and Medicaid. To reduce expenses, the operator will try to cut those costs which are flexible enough to cut, specifically operating costs.14 This can be done by using low-cost labor, by providing only a minimal diet, and by skimping on all sorts of services including maintenance. In the current economic climate, when state legislatures are especially reluctant to spend additional funds, the only practical method is to reduce operating expenses to the barest minimum. (The same economic climate that makes legislatures reluctant to raise reim bursement rates also makes them reluctant to allocate additional funds to inspection of nursing homes and processing of complaints and violations.)
Although some reductions in operating expenses may well be justified economies, evidence presented to the various in vestigations of nursing home care suggests that this tendency to reduce operating expenses has very serious health care costs and human consequences. In order to retain control of the nursing home, the operator must maintain a net operating income suf ficient to cover the mortgage payments. This is true for all real estate. However, because of the unique Medicaid payment process for nursing homes which generally makes it difficult to increase prices (rent) in the short run, the operator has no choice but to minimize operating expenses (refer to footnote 4). It is in the minimizing of operating expenses that the quality of care is reduced. This does not necessarily make the operator a "villain" ; the operator is literally forced into this course of action by the economics of the industry as it is presently structured.
From this examination, it is clear that real estate, not patient
Spring 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q 139 care, is the name of the game. We propose to change the game, to permit focus of both the funds and the efforts on the stated policy objectives, namely high-quality nursing home care of patients.
Our Proposal
Capital facilities, specifically real estate, would be owned by gov ernment. Management, however, would be carried out by the private sector through a competitive process designed to improve the quality of management and to encourage performance monitoring by private individuals and groups as well as government agencies. Once capital facilities (and thus also the real estate aspects of nursing home operation) are out of the hands of the operator, the incentives that currently impede provision of high quality care by diverting resources to capital are also removed. In addition, the taxes presently avoided by those investing in nursing home real estate as a tax shelter can also be collected.15
Because government has a strong tendency to devitalize any system it runs for any length of time, and because government management prevents competition and its attendant benefits, we stop at public ownership. (Considering the extent of government participation in the industry at present, this is actually quite a small step.)
For management, we propose a system of contracts with private management corporations (either profit-making or non profit). This is similar to non-profit hospitals (such as those owned by religious orders) contracting with private, profit-making management firms for operation of their hospitals. In designing this aspect of the system, the most critical considerations are the contract specifications, the methods of achieving full public ex posure of everything that happens during the operation of the system, and the creation of genuine competition.
Contracts would have minimum performance specifications, with bonuses for proven past successes or for arguably beneficial innovations. Contracts would also have specified limited duration, so that at intervals the performance of the contractor could be of-ficially and publicly reviewed and the contract again put up for competitive bid. The previous holder of the contract could of course compete for the upcoming contract, along with anyone else meeting certain limited qualifications.
Since capital assets would no longer be required of the private contractor, entry into the business would be relatively easy in terms of capital requirements. This would allow many management groups to enter the bidding process, assuring a high degree of com petition. The current system requires a substantial real estate in vestment prior to licensing.
The contract-award process, with its required new bidding at each interval, would serve as a brake on unforeseen abuses. This system also has the distinct advantage that it permits competing away potential monopoly profits earned by the management com pany.16 If " excess" profits are earned, they would presumably be competed away at the next contract award.
The differences between the proposed and the existing system can be seen by returning to Table 3. In the proposed system, we are concerned only with lines 1 to 3. Capital costs are no longer relevant to the operator and thus, in order to fulfill the contractual obligations to provide care, the operator is concerned only with line 2 (operating expenses). This is, in fact, the only item which is in volved in the contract. As long as the operator fulfills its con tractual obligations, the state should be satisfied.
Like any owner of a service establishment, government would remain responsible for the quality of management provided in its establishments even though it did not itself carry out the management function. Under the proposed system, however, fulfillment of this responsibility would be greatly simplified. The ultimate test of management effectiveness is the quality of care provided to the nursing home patient. Government would have three major ways to ensure the quality of care. To begin with, government would draw up the contract specifications, presumably 16 This contrasts with California's prepaid health plan (PHP) contracting in several important ways. PHP contractors must either own or contract for subsiantial capital facilities; nursing home contractors will own none. PHP contractors generally negotiate their contracts with the state on an exclusive, non-competitive basis. Nursing home contractors would compete. In practice, the complete PHP contract file is not generally available to the public. The nursing home bids would become public as soon as the bidding period closed, and the entire file would be public. using the advice of people who know something about what makes high-quality care. Second, the competitive bidding process for the award of contracts would permit replacing an inadequate manager with a better one. There would no longer be a need for government to prove malice or neglect; the contract would simply end at the specified time with no promises of renewal. Previous holders o f management contracts would not have vested rights in those con tracts. Since the contractors would have no investment in the facility, changeover to a new contractor would be simple. Inadequate operations would exist, at most, only for the length of the contract. With a well-designed process for review of per formance for widespread dissemination o f information about what is going on, and for effective public participation, market forces can be used to assist government in selecting those managers who provide high-quality care. Instead o f relying only on patients and inspectors for word of contract violations, government would now also have available the resources of competitors for the contract. Firms anxious to succeed in the nursing home management business would have strong financial incentives to report their com petitors' failings through the public-review/contract-award process. Thus, the periodic review process could serve as a market test of the efficiency and quality of the care provided.
Finally, the legal relationship between nursing homes and the government would be greatly simplified. Instead of relying on with drawal of Medicare/Medicaid reimbursements, and in some cases on criminal sanctions, the government would now be in a position to enforce its rights through the civil courts under contract law. This legal process is a great deal easier to implement than the old one, hence the risk to the nursing home operator of violating the contract is substantially greater than before. Failure to fulfill the contract as specified is a breach of contract and subject to civil penalties. More immediately, withholding of the final installment of payment is entirely proper if the contract was not fulfilled.
This system is quite similar to the franchise bidding system outlined by Demsetz (1968) in his proposal for the utility industry. Although there are substantial differences between the nursing home industry and the utility industry, there are strong similarities: a long history of government regulation, essentialness of the ser vice, and the relatively high proportion of total assets invested in capital facilities. Demsetz's system requires two explicit assump-tions: (1) the inputs required to enter production must be available to many potential bidders at prices determined in open markets, and (2) the cost of collusion by bidding rivals must be prohibitively high.
Our proposal for nursing homes would, we believe, meet those conditions, first, by the elimination of substantial capital require ments as an entry barrier, and second, by the large number of facilities within a given market area. Also the periodic-review process, coupled with the ease of entry, would tend to mitigate against collusion by bidders. In addition, monopolistic control on the capacity of the industry would be exercised by government, thus preventing overbedding in some areas and underbedding in others, greatly simplifying the organization of health planning and presumably reducing overall system-wide vacancies.
Under this structure, we are out of the real estate netcash-flow arena. With that change, the incentives which currently impede provision of high-quality care by diverting resources to capital are also removed. With these out of the way, it is now possible for both government and the private sector to address the stated public policy objective of high-quality patient care. If, as a nation, we are still unable to solve the major problems which currently plague nursing home patients, we will have to examine whether the stated public policy objectives are in fact the real public policy objectives.
